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INNOVATION, INTERRUPTED
Next-Generation Surface-Combatant Design
David H. Lewis

The fact that efficient guns and gun-armed warships remained . . . a
European specialty . . . is a strong indication that technology in itself
was not enough. The society must also have the necessary flexibility and
dynamism to absorb technology and change the institutional framework
in order to make the best possible use of them.

P

JAN GLETE, WARFARE AT SEA, 1500–1650

earl Harbor changed everything” is the dramatic beginning to Douglas Smith’s
magisterial book on American World War II aircraft carrier battles in the
Pacific theater. “During that difficult period, naval aviators sought to reconfigure
the tactics, material, and equipment that had been developed during the prewar
years for actual combat.”1 Contemporaneously, “[w]hen war broke out in Europe
in 1939 it quickly became apparent that the large fleet actions for which the
interwar destroyers had been primarily designed were unlikely to materialize.”2
And “[o]nce it became clear that the war in the Pacific would not be following its
anticipated course . . . modifications became necessary in both the U.S. Navy and
the [Imperial Japanese Navy].”3 On 8 December 1941, the United States declared
unrestricted submarine warfare against imperial Japan—a mode of warfare that
both America and Great Britain long had considered immoral and unethical as
a matter of formal diplomatic and naval policy.4
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and modification to fight the next maritime war, one they had long expected and
anticipated?
I seek to answer that question with a blended analysis of technology, engineering, and maritime operations. First, I discuss the incremental prewar warshipdesign process that created the need for ships to be reconfigured and modified
to the demands that World War II imposed—a process conceptually unchanged
since the Elizabethan era. Next, I describe the two new and innovative warshipdesign methodologies—multimission and open-architecture approaches—that
emerged just before and during the 1941–45 Pacific campaign that enabled American naval aviators and submariners to succeed, spectacularly, in new, unexpected
operational environments. I then discuss the dissonance that the contemporaneous use of these three ship-design approaches created in the U.S. Navy’s current
ship-design and ship-sustainment processes. I conclude that the U.S. Navy must
transition to a next-generation surface-combatant-design process that I term “Enterprise design,” to accommodate today’s—and the future’s—dynamic and unpredictable war-fighting environment.
I illuminate the three warship-design philosophies by profiling three famous ships from the Pacific theater of World War II from both operational
and technical perspectives. Interwar strategic and operational theories drove
real engineering innovation and the development of key shipboard and weapon
technical characteristics, but some of these designs could not then be adapted
to new realities that were exposed by naval combat at the start of World War II.
The sources of that inflexibility reach back to design philosophies that emerged
in England during the years leading up to its face-off with the famous Spanish Armada of 1588. I then discuss postwar maritime and operational innovation through to the present day from a technological perspective, showing
the growing, deleterious effects of those four-hundred-year-old ship-design
principles, even as the merits of new approaches were being realized. Finally,
I highlight Danish surface-ship-design innovation, uniquely grounded in this
new approach, to examine historic and future USN surface-ship-design and
-construction trends, closing with a proposal for an American surface-combatant
“navy for the ages.”
A TALE OF THREE SHIPS
The effects of interwar mission uncertainty and technological innovation are
illustrated best by profiling three ships designed in the 1930s that fought in the
Pacific theater during the dramatic early months of America’s involvement in
World War II. The Japanese battleship Yamato, the U.S. submarine Wahoo (SS
238), and the aircraft carrier Hornet (CV 8) embody, respectively, traditional
warship-design concepts and two new design concepts developed during the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/8
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interwar years from operational experience in World War I. Yamato represents
the iterative warship-design process that emerged during the Elizabethan era.
In contrast, Wahoo demonstrated an innovative, new, multimission approach
to that historic warship-design philosophy, while Hornet’s revolutionary, openarchitecture design marked a complete break with prior practices.5
Yamato: Last Ship of the Elizabethan Way
The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) battleship Yamato would have won every engineering and acquisition excellence award available in today’s U.S. Navy. Lethal
and survivable, it was designed to meet a clear, well-founded, well-established,
analytically derived war-fighting requirement.6 Its design incorporated several
new and innovative battleship technologies; a main battery of record-breaking
eighteen-inch guns, massive armor belts, and unprecedented horsepower and
speed made Yamato arguably the most powerful battleship ever built. Yamato and
its sisters were built on schedule and fully met all their combat-performance requirements on delivery to the fleet. As a bonus, Yamato was built in total secrecy;
its subsequent appearance in battle was a complete surprise to the U.S. Navy.7
Yamato was delivered in 1941, just before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor; its
sister ship Musashi was delivered six months later; both were nominally on schedule. Yamato, alone, accounted for half of Japan’s total new-warship construction
tonnage delivered in 1941, and Musashi represented more than a third of its newwarship tonnage for 1942.8 This one shipbuilding program clearly had the IJN’s
highest priority.
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922’s 3 : 5 : 5 ratio established an inferior
number of battleships that Japan could maintain relative to the United States
and Great Britain.9 To comply with the treaty’s terms, Japan quickly broke up
or scrapped battleships sitting on shipways. When Japan abrogated both the
Washington Treaty and the follow-on London Naval Treaty in 1936, it began
a naval-rearmament plan from a position of profound relative weakness.10 Japan did not have the industrial capacity to build up to parity in battleships
with the United States; instead, it needed to build fewer but more-powerful new
ships that could leapfrog established American naval strength. Since the United
States had not built a new posttreaty fleet yet, Japan had to postulate what a
future posttreaty American battleship would look like, then design and build
a more powerful new class of ships to defeat that projected American design.
Yamato was the result. The three planned Yamato-class ships were designed to
defeat five of the imagined new U.S. battleships in a classic Mahan-inspired,
mid-Pacific surface duel.11
Despite the excellence of its design, the power of its weapons, the precision of
its war-fighting requirements, and the skill of its builders, Yamato and its sisters
proved useless in the Pacific War that followed.12 They sank no ships and won no
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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battles; only Yamato ever even sighted an enemy ship.13 Worse, their prodigious
fuel consumption limited both their own and the rest of the IJN’s fleet operations
after naval-fuel supplies came under stress from U.S. commerce raids.14
At 73,000 tons, each Yamato-class battleship represented the industrial equivalent of two aircraft carriers, which, at that time, displaced about 37,000 tons (e.g.,
the Taiho class of 1942). After the Battle of Midway, a planned but unnamed
fourth ship of the class was canceled and the third ship, Shinano, was converted
into an aircraft carrier, although it never engaged in active combat.15
The U.S. Pacific campaign might have gone quite differently if Japan had commissioned two additional aircraft carriers in October 1941 and two more in June
1942 instead of two giant, operationally useless battleships. Recall that, even after losing four aircraft carriers at Midway in June 1942, Japan still possessed a
three-carrier advantage over the United States in the Pacific.16 Even without our
engaging in a detailed counterfactual exercise, given the ferocity of the operations
that followed, if Japan’s post-Midway margin of superiority in aircraft carriers
had been seven instead of three, it is likely that years more of fighting and tens
of thousands more war dead would have been required to achieve the probably
still-inevitable American victory.
The IJN was neither innocent of nor blind to the new naval technologies that
emerged during the interwar era. It embraced many advanced technologies in its
warship designs and made innovative use of aircraft carriers, fixed-wing naval
aviation, submarines, torpedoes, land-based naval aviation, radio, and amphibious warfare. Neither was its embrace of these technologies a matter of mere theory; their application in Japan’s lightning victories in its early Pacific campaigns
serves as clear demonstration of effective conceptualization and implementation
of interwar naval war-fighting technology.
Japan sought to overcome the disadvantages of its smaller battleship fleet by
extending existing warship-design practices to build larger battleships that would
leapfrog ahead of the capabilities of the notional American foes they were expected to face. In that sense, Yamato embodied the culmination of fifty years of successful Japanese fleet operations and ship-design evolution. The ship’s concept of
operations was well founded in established Japanese naval doctrine, which proceeded from broadly accepted principles of modern naval warfare, as articulated
by Alfred Mahan in the 1880s.17 These core operational principles were developed in combat during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and refined further during
combat operations in the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War and against Germany
during World War I.18 Japanese warship-design principles followed proven and
mature engineering principles, extending them as emerging technology permitted to meet expected operational war-fighting needs effectively.19 Lastly, Japan’s decision to build Yamato was consistent with the battleship-centric plans
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/8
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of all other major navies at the time.20 Yamato’s design and operational requirements emphasized lethality and survivability within a well-established analytical
warship-design philosophy. Yet not only did those well-founded, analytically
pure decisions fail to enable victory at sea, but they contributed to imperial Japan’s eventual defeat in 1945.
Wahoo: The New Multimission Ship
USS Wahoo was a historically significant submarine of the Gato class (often referred to as “fleet submarines”). Wahoo and its sisters were designed to provide
fleet reconnaissance and distant support for the American battle fleet. That fleet
was built around a core of powerful battleships attended closely by cruisers and
destroyers. Submarines like Wahoo were to be assigned as advance scouts to
find, track, and report on the Japanese battle fleet. If possible, the submarines
were to conduct attrition attacks of opportunity against Japanese warships, but
on a not-to-interfere basis with their primary role of reconnaissance and reporting.21 To support American fleet operations in the vast Pacific theater, their
design and operational doctrine maximized transit speeds and endurance, while
remaining in compliance with treaty limitations on individual submarine size and
characteristics.22
During the interwar period, both the United States and Great Britain considered unrestricted submarine warfare against unarmed merchant ships to be both
immoral and illegal. Germany’s use of those tactics almost had lost World War
I for Britain and had been the principal basis for a deeply isolationist America’s
entry into that war.23 Both nations pushed hard, but unsuccessfully, to include restrictive language prohibiting unrestricted submarine warfare against merchant
ships into the naval-arms-limitation treaties of the interwar period. It was official
U.S. policy that American submariners would not plan or train for, nor conduct,
any such attacks.24
But, as with Yamato, these operational concepts did not turn out as expected
in practice. On 8 December 1941, as the core of the American battle fleet lay
smoking in the muddy waters of Pearl Harbor, the United States declared unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan. Thus, the fundamental premises of the
operational and design principles of American fleet submarines, developed and
inculcated over two decades, were invalidated within hours of the commencement of combat operations against Japan.25 Yet Wahoo and the other Gato-class
submarines went on to sweep the seas of Japanese merchant ships, fighting well
above their weight after 1943.
Through sheer happenstance, the ship-design characteristics necessary to execute the fleet-reconnaissance mission in the Pacific Ocean matched almost exactly those needed to execute long-range, unrestricted submarine guerre de course
against the Japanese empire. A seventy-five-day patrol duration, prodigious
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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torpedo capacity, a modest surface-gunnery capability, nominal self-defense capability against aircraft, rapid dive capability, long submerged duration, high surface speed, and advanced torpedo fire-control systems were necessary attributes
for both mission sets, and Wahoo and the other Gato-class submarines possessed
them all. In fact, Wahoo’s ten torpedo tubes and twenty-four-torpedo loadout
were almost double the five tubes and fourteen-torpedo loadout of a Type VII
German U-boat of the same period. Wahoo’s unrefueled 11,000-nautical-mile
(nm) range was far superior to the Type VII’s 8,500-nm range, even though Germany had designed its U-boats specifically to conduct unrestricted submarine
warfare against merchant ships.
Despite the more than satisfactory technical characteristics of Wahoo and its
sister ships, America’s implementation of its new policy of unrestricted warfare
against Japan was exceptionally slow.26 Infamously defective torpedoes and lesswell-known engine-performance issues with the submarines that preceded the
Gato-class boats, doctrinal disputes, and the timidity of American submarine
captains limited the combat effectiveness of American submarines until well into
1943. During those early years, USS Wahoo and its famous captain, Lieutenant
Commander Dudley “Mush” Morton, and its even more famous executive officer,
Lieutenant Commander Richard “Dick” O’Kane, along with a few other pioneering officers, led the way in finding, defining, and demonstrating the Gato class’s
inherent but latent combat capabilities.27
Engines and torpedoes could be fixed and new commanding officers trained
and assigned. American submarines in the Pacific eventually waged the most
successful unrestricted-submarine-warfare campaign in history—far more effective than that of their German counterparts in the contemporaneous Battle of
the Atlantic.28 The prewar design of American submarines formed the technical foundation of victory from 1943 to 1945, even though the actual operational
environment was unexpected and ran counter to the expectations embedded in
twenty-five years of explicit American naval war-fighting policy and doctrine.29
Had the United States been required to design new submarines to perform a
completely new, previously undefined mission starting in 1941, the course of the
Pacific campaign would have been profoundly and negatively affected. America
got lucky.
Hornet: A Ship of the Future, a Ship for the Ages
The concept of an aircraft-carrying ship was born and almost fully matured to its
modern form by Britain’s Royal Navy between 1914 and 1918 with the conversion
of the 14,000-ton HMS Argus in 1917–18.30 It had a flight deck stacked on top of
an enclosed hangar deck and vertical elevators to move aircraft between them;
it was missing only an island and catapults. In the United States, the 12,000-ton
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USS Langley (CV 1) was converted from a collier in 1922 as a low-rent version of
Argus. America’s much larger follow-on carriers, the 37,000-ton USS Lexington
(CV 2) and USS Saratoga (CV 3), were converted from incomplete battle-cruiser
hulls in 1927. Both were considered “too big” at the time, with their size having
been dictated by the hulls on which they were built rather than by aviation warfighting requirements.31 Invoking standard ship-design philosophies to build the
first American aircraft carrier designed from the keel up produced the 14,000-ton
USS Ranger (CV 4) in 1934 and the similar USS Wasp (CV 7) in 1940.
But in the four years between Ranger’s design and commissioning something
happened that brought the entire philosophy behind that design into question.
The airplanes it was intended to embark became obsolete and were replaced with
much larger, more-powerful aircraft. Although Ranger incorporated many successful innovations—most notably, an open hangar bay dedicated to maintenance
and ammunition loading, a starboard above-deck island, flight-deck “galleries,”
and some limited gun armament—USN designers quickly realized that their
warship-design paradigm was flawed.32 Between 1927 and 1940, the U.S. Navy
fielded three generations of frontline fighters whose takeoff weight and engine
horsepower (hp) increased from the 2,750 lb, 450 hp Boeing P-12/F4B in 1927
to the 7,952 lb, 1,200 hp Grumman F4F Wildcat in 1940. Attack aircraft showed
similar generational growth, culminating in 1942 with the 15,905 lb, 1,700 hp
Grumman TBF Avenger. Dive-bombers did not exist in 1927 but joined the
American air wings in the late 1930s. This sustained pace of weapon-system development was unprecedented in the history of naval-weapons technology; new
airplane models were fielded every eighteen to twenty-four months.33 The American naval-aviation community did not follow long-established naval-warshipdesign practices, and the U.S. Navy could not afford to build a new ship every
time a new airplane was invented.34 A different design approach was needed.
The solution was to decouple the weapon (aircraft) from the ship as much as
possible. Rather than having hundreds or thousands of design touch points—
called interfaces—between the weapon and the ship, the Navy’s aircraft carrier
design team sought to minimize and standardize these interfaces. Greater excess margins for weight and power were added to accommodate unknown future
growth in aircraft characteristics. Defining maximum landing weight, takeoff
wind, deck loading, elevator lift capacity, hangar dimensions, aviation-fuel load,
and bomb-storage capacity allowed ship designers to isolate themselves from the
pace of change in the aviation community.35 A new ship would be required only
once one or more of those key interfaces or ship-design margins were going to be
violated by the characteristics of a new air wing.
Ranger’s design flaws were corrected in the three ships of the 25,000-ton
Yorktown class, which comprised its namesake, USS Enterprise (CV 6), and USS
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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Hornet (CV 8), commissioned in 1937, 1938, and 1940, respectively. The class
improved on the “too big” Lexington-class hulls and incorporated the hard lessons of the inadequate Ranger and Wasp—ships that were functionally obsolete
before they were commissioned.36 Like Saratoga and Lexington, Hornet was a big,
roomy ship with large elevators, a fast hull, clearly defined air-wing interfaces,
and generous design margins.
After Japan’s attack against Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, President
Franklin Roosevelt directed an attack on Japan’s home islands. The Navy tried
to demur, because most of the battleships it traditionally would have needed
to enable such an attack would require years of repairs before they were ready
for an offensive campaign. The Army had no bomber with the necessary range.
Roosevelt was undeterred, and within a few weeks a Navy-Army team determined
that a new Army medium bomber, the B-25 Mitchell, theoretically could take off
from a Yorktown-class aircraft carrier deck with enough relative wind over the
deck. Several weeks of testing ashore convinced commanders that it could be
done, and the Doolittle Tokyo raid was conducted successfully on 18 April 1942
from Hornet—just four months after the Pearl Harbor attack.37 Although militarily insignificant, the attack was a huge psychological success, crushing Japan’s
self-image of impregnability and boosting American morale at a critically low
point.38 It was brilliant, and brilliantly executed.
Had anyone proposed that Army bombers operate from Navy aircraft carriers
before December 1941, they would have been not only laughed at but probably
removed from their jobs as well. There was no chance of such a suggestion being
written into a ship-requirements document or included in a ship design. No ship
designer envisioned it, and no war plan proposed it—but it surely was needed,
and it happened.
B-25s happened to fit within enough of Hornet’s design interfaces to permit
pierside loading and afloat fueling, arming, and takeoff. To use modern terms,
the pace of aircraft development forced the aircraft carrier designers to invent an
open-architecture design approach, and it decoupled the ship from the embarked
air wing. The designers focused primarily on defining clear interfaces to an embarked “mission module”—the air wing—rather than the internal technical or
war-fighting details of that mission module—the airplanes. Rather than fully and
inclusively defining all the desired missions of a ship, then designing it to meet
that exact capability—as with Yamato—the new aircraft carrier approach broadly
defined a “capability to have a capability” by not overspecifying current capabilities, leaving the operational door open for future, unknown mission-module (i.e.,
air wing, ordnance, and embarked personnel) war-fighting capabilities.39 Lethality
was removed from the ship-design process, ceding that characteristic to the embarked air wing.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/8
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The result has been profound and revolutionary. Aircraft carriers now routinely serve continuously for up to fifty years as operationally relevant, first-line
warships. That has not happened for surface combatant ships since a forty-yearold HMS Victory fought at Trafalgar in 1805. Aircraft carriers routinely and easily
accommodate major advances in war-fighting technology that were unknown at
commissioning.40 USS Midway (CV 41) was designed in 1943 with Mitsubishi
Zero fighters and Betty bombers in mind, but spent most of its forty-seven-year
service life carrying jet fighters operating against supersonic Backfire bombers
carrying nuclear cruise missiles, interspersed with combat missions to Korea,
Vietnam, and Iraq, among many others. Beyond the Zeros and Bettys, none of
this was, or could have been, anticipated by the ship’s original designers. And
Midway was not unique; quite a few other major World War II–era warships saw
similar extended frontline service lives—all of them aircraft carriers.
THREE SHIPS, THREE DESIGN PHILOSOPHIES
Yamato represented the culmination of four centuries of successful ship-design
practices, incrementally optimizing explicitly defined operational requirements
into pristine, tightly constrained designs that met highly detailed war-fighting
requirements for lethality and survivability. Wahoo and its Gato-class sisters
accidentally discovered the advantages of being capable of conducting multiple
primary war-fighting missions. Gato-class submarines had operational characteristics that permitted them to operate effectively in other closely related warfare
missions beyond what had been designated originally. After all, sinking a merchant ship at sea is not too much different from sinking a warship; if anything,
it may be easier. Hornet broke the mold, demonstrating the combat value of a
completely new open-architecture, adaptable ship-design approach. Designing
for an interface to an embarked weapon rather than to a specific combat mission
allowed the U.S. Navy to change the ship’s mission easily by changing its mission
module—the embarked air wing. In the decade before the Pearl Harbor attack,
the number of viable warship-design philosophies tripled. In the subsequent
eight decades, there has been a broad failure to appreciate the differences and
trade-offs among them, to the detriment of many shipbuilding programs.
The Foundations of Modern Ship Design
So, how did Yamato’s flawed design happen? Why was Wahoo’s mission so poorly
defined? Why did the naval officers and engineers responsible feel so sure in
their approach to Yamato and most of the other surface combatant ships in their
fleets? The answers lay in the origins of modern fighting-ship design in sixteenthcentury Europe.
Elizabeth Tudor, daughter of King Henry VIII, ascended the throne of England as queen on 17 November 1558. Elizabeth I’s new domain was bankrupt,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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torn by religious strife, resource poor, and diplomatically isolated. Worse, the
leader of the most powerful nation in the Western world, King Phillip II of Spain,
believed that he was the rightful king of England as a result of his marriage to
Elizabeth’s since-deceased half sister, Queen Mary I, who preceded her on the
throne. Elizabeth had caught a tough assignment, but she was very much up to
the challenge.41 Recognizing that her first priority was to refill the depleted royal
treasury, England’s new “Pirate Queen” invoked the “Willie Sutton rule” 350 years
before it was first articulated; she dispatched her sea captains to steal Spanish
treasure en route to Europe from the New World.42 Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter
Raleigh, Sir John Hawkins, and their fellow English captains were moderately
successful in this effort.
However, they soon reported problems with their ships in battle against their
intended Spanish victims. The “warships” of Elizbeth’s early reign rarely were
purpose-built; instead, most were temporarily converted merchant ships. Superstructures (called “castles”) and small guns were added during the short Atlantic
fighting season. High castles forward (from which the nautical term fo’c’sle derives) and aft enabled plunging fire from handheld weapons against galleys and
unmodified merchant ships. Larger, mounted weapons were fired over bulwarks;
the idea of cutting holes in the sides of ships for deck guns was an emerging, risky
technology first tried in 1501.43 When not engaged in naval service, these ships
would be stripped of their war-fighting gear and operate again in merchant service to offset their annual operating expenses.
These makeshift warships were slow and difficult to maneuver. Clumsy handling characteristics were not a significant problem for hauling cargo but were
liabilities in a fight. Spanish ships were armed with guns made for the army that
were unaltered for naval service and were operated by embarked soldiers; the
sailors sailed and the soldiers fought. The Spanish employed shoot-and-board
tactics; they approached directly toward an enemy ship, fired their heavy guns
once, and then grappled and boarded the target vessel to overwhelm the enemy
crew with crossbows, small arms, and sword- and pike-wielding soldiers. As has
been the practice of land powers afloat for centuries, Spain turned sea fights into
land fights. The Spanish also adopted the Mediterranean oared-galley practice of
mounting a few very heavy guns on their bows that could fire only forward, creating the galleon: a ship with the low bows of a galley to accommodate big, forwardfiring guns and the high stern of a converted merchant ship to enable plunging
fire when alongside an enemy.44 Ship’s guns of the day were a century away from
using recoil mechanisms to permit reloading from inside the ship. Instead, guns
were reloaded in place by gun crews hanging over the side of the ship on ropes
and in bosun’s chairs—a time-consuming and difficult task even for experienced
sailors, and not one that soldiers did well. Still, the galleon’s design suited Spanish
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/8
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fighting tactics while retaining the ships’ inherently mercantile mission of hauling treasure from the New World back to Spain.
King Henry VIII, Elizabeth’s father, had been a gun and ship enthusiast.45 He
liked the flash and bang of guns—the bigger the better—and he liked the power
and pomp of a big ship. Elizabeth inherited a navy with few soldiers and many
guns; sailors fought, manned the guns, and sailed the ship. To defeat the heavily
crewed Spanish ships and their aggressive frontal attacks, English ships needed
to be able to stand off from their targets and fire their guns, trying to kill as many
Spanish soldiers as possible to even the odds before closing to board and seize the
galleon’s cargo of treasure. English ships needed to be faster, more maneuverable,
and more heavily armed than their Spanish opponents.
To achieve greater speed and maneuverability, English ships needed to be
slimmer and carry more sail; to overwhelm the heavier Spanish ships, they
needed to carry as many guns as possible, both broadside-firing and forwardfiring. These characteristics were entirely incompatible with the ones that made
a good merchant ship of the day; lethality and survivability needed to dominate,
while as many other ship characteristics that reduced those qualities as possible
needed expunging. Dedicated warship design was born. The new English warships would be designed “from the keel up” to perform a single, clearly articulated
combat mission. These ships enabled English naval tactics that no converted warships at the time could replicate. The new warship would sail toward the enemy,
then wheel away at range, firing its guns in sequence as they came to bear. When
safely out of range again, English sailors would clamber over the side to reload.
Then they would repeat the feat, raking their targets again and again. English
ships needed continuous, open internal decks to allow for the free flow of orders,
ammunition, and sailors among guns as they executed these complex attacks and
maneuvers. Elizabeth’s warship designs had to be dedicated to and optimized for
war at sea; the vessels no longer could be converted merchant ships. The result
was the fast English galleon—one of the first true, from-the-keel-up, sailing warship designs.46
Standardized ship designs permitted different English shipyards and dockyards to build similarly performing ships, enhancing their combat performance
when operating together. Elizabeth was the first English monarch to provide
shipbuilders with ship-performance specifications, a prototypical version of
“build to print” contracting.47 She also needed an effective and efficient naval
infrastructure to manage and maintain these ships, since they no longer could
offset their operating costs by hauling cargo in the off-season. She added capacity to her father’s pioneering naval depots and dry docks, supplemented their
infrastructure, and built an efficient civil naval administration—the precursor of
the British Admiralty.48 The purpose of all this was to store, manage, care for, and
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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protect the ships and their equipment, stores, and armament when they were not
actually fighting—which is to say, most of the time.
Bereft of money but awash in recent combat experience, Elizabeth and her
sea captains defined a lean, tightly coupled design-build process. The naval administration they established to manage that process consistently delivered lethal
and survivable ships using available technologies that exactly met her immediate
operational maritime needs at minimum cost and with maximum operational
effectiveness.
The result was brilliantly effective, as demonstrated during the many failed
Spanish armadas of the late sixteenth century. The most famous was the doomed
armada of 1588, made up of ponderous, overmanned, poorly led, poor-sailing,
and overloaded ships; Elizabeth’s purpose-built warships sailed circles around
them. Ammunition usage data from the fighting show that the Spanish ships
fired, on average, one shot per gun per day, while English ships fired each gun
one to one and a half times per hour.49 As a result of this extraordinary firing-rate
disparity, the Spanish Armada never ran out of ammunition before its ultimate
destruction, while the English fleet ran out several times. In fact, obtaining more
ammunition for unexpectedly depleted shipboard magazines quickly defined and
constrained English fighting operations after the first day of the weeklong battle.
The fleet- and ship-design approach that produced the successes of Elizabeth’s
Navy Royal matured over the ensuing centuries into the modern warship requirements definition and design process.50 The iterative process began with a clear
definition of the immediate operational environment, explicitly defining the new
weapons (lethality) and innovative ship characteristics (survivability) that meeting
the defined mission required; then it optimized the warship’s design to remove all
other nominally unnecessary characteristics. The process was repeated for the next
generation of warships, then refined, repeated, and refined again ad nauseam until
it produced the modern steel warships that appeared in the early twentieth century.
That iterative process repeated until 21 May 1934, when the keel of USS Yorktown (CV 5), lead ship of the class that included Hornet, was laid at Newport News
Shipbuilding and Drydock Company in Newport News, Virginia. Yorktown was
the result of an entirely new approach to naval technology and warship design.
As with Queen Elizabeth I’s Navy Royal, this methodological revolution was a response to new technologies and new war-fighting requirements that existing design processes were inadequate to address. Nearly four hundred years of established
naval-ship-design practice should have come to an end at that point; regrettably,
they did not.
Surface-Ship-Design Practices
Elizabethan design methods were effective as long as naval technology evolved
at a pace roughly in step with contemporaneous ship life cycles of forty to fifty
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/8
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years. The method began to unravel when the rate of technical innovation in
naval technology started to accelerate during the Industrial Revolution. Steam
propulsion technology first moved afloat in the early 1800s and was becoming
mainstream by the 1830s.51 Gun, gun-propellant, and ship-armor technological
advances followed quickly through the Crimean War, the American Civil War,
and the emergence of the modern steel navies in the 1890s, culminating with
the all-big-gun battleships of World War I fame.52 The long century between the
Battles of Trafalgar (1805) and Jutland (1916) was the most innovative in the
history of naval technology to that point. A British sailor transported from Sir
Francis Drake’s flagship Revenge in 1588 would not have been uncomfortable
aboard HMS Victory at Trafalgar, both sailing warships; a sailor from Victory
would have been completely lost on board Admiral John Jellicoe’s flagship at Jutland, the dreadnought HMS Iron Duke.53 The technological differences between
Victory in 1805 and the first all-big-gun battleship, HMS Dreadnought in 1906,
comprise, in my opinion, the greatest degree of change across any one-hundredyear period in naval history. But it did not stop there. By the time of the Battle of
Jutland in 1916, Dreadnought itself—archetype of the modern battleship—was
deemed so obsolete that it was left out of Britain’s Grand Fleet, just ten years after
it was commissioned. Dreadnought was scrapped in 1919, while barely a teenager.
Throughout this century of radical technology innovation, Elizabethan-school
design principles nevertheless held strong despite the limitations that clearly were
emerging. New weapons, new propulsion technology, new armor, and new operational requirements all necessitated substantial ship-design changes to implement. Most warships could not be retrofitted to accommodate new technologies. Under the Elizabethan-school design rubric, major maritime innovation
required building new ships. To compensate, design-build cycles were shortened;
new ship classes were designed almost annually, with each year’s more lethal and
survivable designs improving on, and even eclipsing, the previous ones. The pace
of advancement became so fast that ships often became obsolete before they were
launched.54 New ships had to be built whenever a major new war-fighting technology was developed. Elizabethan-school design principles, focused only on
meeting contemporary lethality and survivability requirements, removed future
adaptability and flexibility from baseline class designs. Margins for growth and
adaptation were, and often still are, seen as waste.55 Ships were built to meet the
day’s threat with the day’s technology, and tomorrow’s war-fighting needs were
judged to be a problem for tomorrow’s leaders. As a result, planned ship-service
lives were achieved rarely, if ever. Modernization, if attempted, was invariably a
long, expensive, and often unsatisfactory process.56
A technical note on design margins and interfaces. Margins are excess capacities in key characteristics such as displacement, power, cooling, and stability that
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are designed into ships above what the current systems on that ship require to
allow for future modernization and additional equipment. Margins allow for real
growth in those characteristics up to their defined (and design) maxima. Interfaces are the connections between systems within a ship. Interfaces allow for
changes on either side of the interface without breaking functionality on the
other, so long as both sides comply with the interface standard. Interface standards are why, without affecting the power company’s grid, you can plug your
new lava lamp into the same electrical outlet into which your clock radio used
to be plugged. Likewise, your lava lamp will continue to work when the power
company switches from coal- to solar-power generation. Margins are why you
blow a fuse or trip a breaker if the appliances you plug in draw too much power.
After World War I, maritime technology continued to change rapidly. In a
1936 paper, Britain’s director of naval construction observed that between 1920
and 1935 the weight of antiaircraft armament on warships tripled, deck protection weight quintupled, and the weather-deck area occupied by aircraft and their
associated equipment went from 0 to 20 percent. And “all of these increases had to
be accommodated in a hull limited in size by the [naval arms] treaties.”57 No consideration was given to unexpected operational requirements. In fact, had those
treaty restrictions been relaxed, “there is every reason to believe that the major
navies would have simply opted for more main guns and more torpedoes.”58 This
is exactly what happened when Yamato was designed, once freed from those treaty restrictions. The Elizabethan-school design philosophy’s ruthless optimization
imperative did not allow for any other path.
By contrast, American aircraft carrier commanders in the Pacific theater discovered, in the early months of the war, the crucial operational flexibility that
open-architecture ship design provided. After the Battle of the Coral Sea, in May
1942, American commanders complained that their strike-heavy air wings needed more fighters instead. Within three weeks the fighter allocation to air wings
was increased by 69 percent—just in time to make a material contribution to the
U.S. victory at the decisive Battle of Midway, in June 1942.59 Similarly, American
dive-bombers, as noted earlier, were unknown when the first American aircraft
carriers were designed in the 1920s and early 1930s. But they proved to be decisive in those early Pacific naval battles—just five years after they were introduced
afloat.60 For comparison, no battleships or cruisers ever doubled their air-defense
capability in three weeks or changed out their principal weapon system in less
than five years.
After World War II, American warship design bifurcated, with a new
Hornet-style process applied to aircraft carriers and an updated Elizabethan-school
process applied to new, multimission surface combatants. Maritime operations in
World War II finally had exposed the fatal limitations of the classic single-mission
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Elizabethan-school approach while illuminating the new, derivative, multimission path discovered in Wahoo and other ship classes during the war. Battleships,
largely unable to perform their primary surface-warfare mission for want of targets, became artillery platforms for shore bombardment in support of amphibious
assaults and air-defense platforms for task groups and fleets. Destroyers became
radar pickets, antisubmarine platforms, and air-defense ships, in addition to performing occasionally their prewar designated mission as surface escorts.
The U.S. Marine Corps proved to be as disruptive to American ship designers as the naval-aviation community had been, and amphibious ship designers
quickly adopted the same open architecture and flexible ship-design approach
used for aircraft carriers. This left the Marines free to buy new tanks and amphibious assault vehicles without having to make the U.S. Navy buy new ships, so
long as they complied with defined interface and margin standards.61
In brief, aircraft carriers and amphibious ships demonstrated the design implications of “cross-domain” ships. Aircraft development and the Marines did not
follow Elizabethan-school ship-design rules, instead changing and modernizing
at a far faster pace than the ship-design and shipbuilding communities could tolerate. The solution, logically enough, was to separate, in a controlled way, those
noncompliant domains (aviation and amphibious operations) from the ship domain in the ship design; interfaces and margins had to become the connection
(and insulator) between the slow-moving world of ship design and shipbuilding
and the high-speed worlds of amphibious operations and naval aviation. By way
of analogy, interfaces and margins are like the gearing that allows a high-speed
automobile engine to be coupled to a low-speed tire or a high-speed marine gas
turbine to be connected to a low-speed ship propeller. Aircraft carriers and amphibious ship designs are thus “loosely coupled” to their embarked weapon systems through a defined set of interface standards and design margins.
Surface combatants, however, were not subject to the same operational discontinuities and frequent disruptions of the aviation and amphibious communities, leaving their designers comparatively free to follow the old rules—slightly modified by adding Wahoo-like multimission capabilities—in peacetime.
Surface-combatant designs did not have “gearing”; they were “direct drive”—new
weapon systems required new ships. Surface combatants retained the traditional,
Elizabethan-school “tight coupling” between the ship and their installed weapon
system. Embarking versus installing weapon systems became the principal design
differentiator between Hornet-like ships and Yamato- or Wahoo-like ships.62
But advances in surface-ship technology since the 1950s have seen the same
high rate of obsolescence as before World War II, if not greater, challenging the
modified Elizabethan-school approach. Missile, radar, and computer technologies all saw rapid innovation, generating a series of war-fighting capability leaps.
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The new multimission approach (i.e., Wahoo-like) appeared to offer an easy solution to the problems this pace of innovation posed. It allowed fewer multimission
ships to replace larger numbers of single-mission ships (and, later, multimission
ships capable of fewer missions) while still introducing new technologies exclusively through the ship-design and shipbuilding process, exactly as had been
done for centuries; as a result, fleet size collapsed but fleet combat capability multiplied. This technology environment perpetuated the same high rate of design
turnover and abbreviated warship service lives that had plagued advanced navies
since the 1830s; deploying significant new surface-combatant war-fighting technologies still required building new ships.
Facing their own new, internal, accelerating technology drivers and constrained by the Elizabethan-school ship-design process, shipboard weapon and
system developers (e.g., of radar, sonar, and fire-control systems) began to adopt
the approaches developed by aircraft carrier designers in the 1930s and amphibious ship designers in the 1950s. They established strict interface standards and
clearly defined margins within the confines of the systems they developed for
surface combatants. Formal engineering principles of modularity, adaptability, and flexibility began to be developed in the 1960s in response to this high
rate of technological change, and they have produced enduring capabilities that
long outlasted the first hulls into which they were installed.63 The computercontrolled, software-based SPY-1 radar, in all its versions and descendants, in
combination with standardized computer designs and software methods, allows
war-fighting-capability improvements to be implemented through computer
software upgrades far more easily and cheaply than modernizations that require
a hardware redesign and installation. Modular vertical launching systems (e.g.,
VLS) permit new missiles to be deployed without having to install new launchers unique to each missile. Despite these system successes, surface combatant
ship designs remained products of the time-tested Elizabethan-school processes
and methods; once weapon-system hardware (radars, launchers, computers, etc.)
were installed, major changes and hardware modernization of weapon systems
became difficult, if not impossible.
Warships today are collections of independently developed systems, each with
its own development plan, budget track, and sustainment plan. The genius behind the Aegis system was to integrate the entire air-defense detect-to-engage sequence into a single, unified system with common development, execution, and
sustainment processes.64 But despite Aegis’s four-decade record of success, this
level of integration is only beginning to emerge in other types of systems installed
in modern, multimission warships.
As with Wahoo—whose secondary mission, attrition attacks against enemy
warships, became its primary mission at the start of World War II, just applied to
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merchant ships—modern multimission ships can accommodate new threats so
long as the threat emerges within the explicitly defined capabilities of the ship’s existing weapons; any new threat that emerges within the limits of that extant “mission space” can be addressed with few or no modifications to the ship’s systems.
The addition of a ballistic-missile-defense (BMD) capability to selected Aegisequipped warships after the Cold War demonstrates this sort of mission flexibility. Sometimes even these expanded capabilities themselves can be expanded
for new missions, as in 2008 when USS Lake Erie (CG 70) successfully conducted
an antisatellite mission using a space-intercept capability inherent in its existing
BMD capability, which itself was a modification of the ship’s existing Aegis areaair-defense capability.65
Being unable to add unexpected war-fighting capability doomed volume production of the new Zumwalt class of ships years before the first ship was commissioned.66 The first five ships of the Ticonderoga (CG 47) class were decommissioned
after as little as eighteen years of service because they could not accommodate new
missiles and new hardware, just as HMS Dreadnought had been scrapped eightysix years earlier for similar reasons. The technology was new but hampered by the
same old ship-design process. From my time as a junior naval officer, I remember
a Terrier and Tartar missile “New Threat upgrade” being installed on dozens of
ships decades after a Soviet “New Threat” antiship missile was fielded, then those
recently and expensively upgraded ships were decommissioned just as quickly and
en masse after the Cold War ended. The price of inflexibility created by focusing
ship designs principally on contemporary threats continues to be high.67
Today, it is even more difficult to predict what is required from encounter to
encounter, much less from year to year, and, as well articulated in 2011 by former
Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, it is almost impossible to predict warfighting requirements any more than a decade into the future.68 Paradoxically,
weapons technology is changing even faster today than it did during the Cold
War.69 More importantly, it is changing in unpredicted and unpredictable ways.
Aggressive international sales of sophisticated weapon systems quickly proliferate tough new threats globally.70 In addition, modern computer technology is no
longer dominated by military requirements, as it was in the 1960s and 1970s; the
commercial market is driving even more unplanned change into an already challenged weapon-system and ship-design environment.71
In brief, the situation facing surface-combatant designers today is the same
as that faced by mid-twentieth-century aircraft carrier and amphibious ship designers. Substantial technology issues outside the control of surface-combatant
ship designers are creating design dilemmas that materially affect both current
and future war-fighting performance. In the 1930s and 1950s, respectively, crossdomain technology requirements overrode existing aircraft carrier and amphibious
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ship design processes. Today, core surface-combatant war-fighting demands are
less certain and less predictable, but current installed ship weapon systems have
limited capacity to be expanded beyond the explicitly defined war-fighting requirements to which they were built.
Surface combatants now have an equivalent “cross-domain” design driver:
technology. To generalize a bit, all warship designs are driven by the expected
technology requirements of some defined time horizon. When they are built to
face an immediate and existential threat, as Queen Elizabeth I’s fast galleons were,
longer-range technology drivers can be ignored. In this special case, ships are
designed and built “today” with today’s technology and today’s threats in mind,
and out of a deliberate choice to “worry about tomorrow, tomorrow.” When technology moves slowly, perhaps at the pace of a ship’s operational life (nominally
thirty to forty years), as it did between 1588 and the early nineteenth century,
new technologies can be implemented in new-construction ships in the normal
course of business. As the pace of technology change quickens, however, that
design rubric becomes less and less palatable, as navies get caught between the
high cost of building new ships and the high cost of modernizing existing, oldtechnology ships.
Separating the ugly details of implementing rapidly changing new war-fighting
technologies (such as airplanes, tanks, radars, missiles, and computers) from the
long-service, stable technology base of the ship’s platform design (hull, engines,
electrical power, passive survivability, etc.) as much as possible is a proven way of
resolving this conundrum (e.g., Hornet). Lethality—to use a term in vogue—is a
measure of the missile being launched, not the ship launching it. Explicitly separating them by using a clearly defined, stable engineering interface ensures that a
navy can achieve rapid technology insertion, affordable modernization, sustainable sustainment costs, and full ship-service-life performance.
This argues for the U.S. Navy to abandon all vestiges of the Elizabethanschool ship-design processes for new surface combatants and adopt a Hornet-like
modular and flexible whole-ship design process that better accommodates today’s dynamic, technology-driven war-fighting environment. I choose to call the
Hornet-style modular and flexible ship-design process “Enterprise design.” Enterprise design begins in earnest where the ship-design process ends for the Elizabethan school. Modern war-fighting requirements and surface-combatant designs
must extend in time beyond contemporary, known needs, and they should seek
to support the entire planned service life of the proposed ship.72 Unbeknownst to
them, the engineers who designed USS Midway (CV 41) in 1943 were designing
a ship that would operate supersonic jet fighters in 1983; they had no idea that
was what they were doing, or even that naval jet fighters might soon exist outside
1940s science-fiction stories.
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This is different from improving or enlarging design margins. Midway had
design margin when it was built, and new margin was added throughout its service life to accommodate new flight-deck structures, elevators, steam catapults,
and arresting gear. The capacities of those devices, in terms of size, weight, point
loading, and so on, are the interface points between the ship and the aircraft, not
margin. Those interfaces can be changed, and they were in Midway, but once in
place they did not need modification to accommodate new airplanes unless the
new airplane exceeded the interface standard. That is why USS Gerald R. Ford
(CVN 78) needed new and different catapults and arresting gear from those of
the Nimitz class it is replacing; the expectation is that the airplanes of the future
(especially uncrewed aerial vehicles) are going to break the interface standards of
the Navy’s existing 1950s-era shipboard-aviation systems.73
Since it is, in practice, impossible to know in detail what war fighting will
require twenty to thirty years into the future, critical surface-combatant design
parameters must focus more on the capability to accept future change than on
delivering a ship that meets today’s defined war-fighting capabilities. A new ship
not only must have sufficient war-fighting capability at commissioning; it also
must have an extended “capability to have a capability” throughout its planned
service life. A ship must be commissioned with a “minimum viable capability”
(e.g., F4U Corsairs on Midway in 1946) but with interfaces and margins that can
accommodate a radically different but operationally necessary capability late in
its service life (e.g., F-18 Hornets on Midway in 1990).74
The U.S. Navy’s thirty-eight (as of fall 2021) operational littoral combat ships,
expeditionary transfer dock, expeditionary mobile base, and expeditionary fast
transport vessels are modular, flexible ship platforms that already embody some
version of the Enterprise ship-design process, absent an explicit life-of-ship warfighting requirement. They are the pioneers of this sea change for the American
surface navy. These ships, together with the service’s eleven aircraft carriers and
forty-three amphibious ships, mean that the U.S. Navy already has the world’s
largest national fleet of modular, flexible, adaptable ships. To expand on the potential hinted at by that fleet, the Navy must develop the life-of-ship war-fighting
requirements for future surface combatants and determine how to define those
requirements to meet unknown future threats, enemies, and operational situations successfully.
Return of the Viking Longships
Viking longships revolutionized ship design and shipbuilding in northern Europe in the late Middle Ages. Their unique “clinker-built” iron-nail and clippedframe construction made them strong enough to weather the stormy seas of
northern Europe but also light and flexible enough to sail up rivers, and even to
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be carried across short land portages. Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian Viking
kings sailed their longships throughout Ireland, France, Russia, and England and
even into the Mediterranean Sea. Initially these expeditions were exercises in
pillaging, killing, and looting but later were used to conquer, trade, and colonize
throughout the European continent; the Vikings’ flexible, adaptable longships
could carry colonists and goods as easily as warriors.75
The modern Royal Danish Navy, descendant of those Viking mariners, has
embraced its own version of the Enterprise design philosophy to great effect. The
Danish navy’s combat mission during the Cold War could be defined cynically
as being ready to die bravely, valiantly, and quickly in a presumed-to-fail effort to
prevent a Soviet naval breakout from the Baltic Sea. This produced a Danish fleet
composed largely of conventional torpedo boats, coastal gunboats, and minewarfare ships.
With the end of that Cold War mission, Denmark’s small fleet became largely
obsolete, and the Danish navy began seeking new missions and innovative paths
to meet them.76 Rather than developing an immediate, analytically derived conventional maritime mission, as Elizabethan-school design principles would prescribe, the Danes focused on building an inherently flexible “capability to have a
capability,” to be realized when, and as, new war-fighting requirements and new
maritime technologies emerged in the future.77
Recognizing that weapon-system obsolescence was the key driver for ship
obsolescence, the Danes developed a new technology interface approach called
Standard Flex, alternatively known as StanFlex or STANFLEX. StanFlex is a
tightly defined, modular-mission payload system for embarking a ship’s weapon,
mission, and communications equipment. Using standard-size containers with
defined interfaces that can be embarked in a short amount of time allows a surface combatant to add capability, switch among missions, or modernize installed
weapon systems quickly and as needed to support a short-term mission requirement or implement a key technology upgrade.78 This surface-combatant innovation is exactly like embarking new dive-bombers with aircraft carrier air wings in
1937 or embarking new Abrams tanks with Marine expeditionary units on amphibious ships without having to build new ships to install them.
The success of the modular-payload system led the Danish navy to design allnew warships with StanFlex slots and to install slots on older vessels during major
refits. The U.S. Navy may have the largest fleet of Enterprise-design ships, but the
Danish navy’s main battle force now is composed solely of StanFlex-configured
Enterprise-school ships, establishing it as the most transformed, modular, flexible, and adaptable surface fleet in the world.79
Denmark, in turn, has used these modular, flexible ships to build a position
of worldwide naval visibility and operational excellence.80 Danish StanFlex ships
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have deployed to the Indian Ocean for counterpiracy patrols; to the Persian Gulf,
where they provide valuable escort and other war-fighting services; and to the
eastern Mediterranean to support the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons in
2012.81 In each case, the Enterprise design of the ships paired with the StanFlex
interface system allowed the Danish navy to custom-configure each ship to the
special and unique circumstances of each deployment, making them not just multimission but custom-mission surface combatants—exactly like Hornet. Today, the
Danes are seeking to expand their ships’ missions further, well beyond anything
their original designers imagined.82 These are the Danes’ new Viking longships—
long in tenure and utility. The Royal Navy has made the same conceptual choice
for its five new Type 31 frigates—a derivative design of Denmark’s StanFlex frigates—with the first scheduled to launch in 2023 and enter service by 2028.83 Denmark has built a navy for the ages: flexible, adaptable, and perpetually useful.
The key to much of this, as with Hornet, is the ability of Danish surfacecombatant platforms to support the innovative capacity inherent in StanFlex systems. As was the case with Hornet, the ships’ capacity for change, implemented through their universal standard interfaces for embarked (versus installed)
weapon systems, forms the foundation for a lifetime of operational relevance.
Elizabethan-school design philosophy prizes eliminating margins—considering
them to be waste—and lifetime margins for weight, power, flotation, and the like
between 5 and 25 percent are common in ships designed this way. Denmark’s
StanFlex ships have design margins between 50 and 300 percent, which, in combination with their StanFlex interface system, makes them highly accommodative to major weapon-systems changes, refits, and technology upgrades.84 They
use a modern shipboard data center (a “private cloud”) architecture for hosting software—something the U.S. Defense Department is still modeling, with its
emerging “software defined, hardware enabled” system-design rubric.85 Weapons and control consoles are devices and peripherals to the integrated combat
system.86 Upgrades and customizations mostly involve changing software and
possibly changing a StanFlex module. Upgrading a major combat system on a
Danish StanFlex ship can be completed in several weeks, whereas an American,
Elizabethan-style refit can take months, if not years.87
LCS: A Model for America’s New Surface Navy
The Littoral Combat Ship class (LCS) is the U.S. Navy’s first attempt to implement
Enterprise design principles in a surface combatant. The LCS class is unique in
that it has two variants, a monohull and a trimaran design, that are so different
that they are functionally separate classes, despite their common designation.
They are small, high-speed, low-draft warships with a minimal crew and modular mission capability. Being such a radical departure from prior U.S. surfacecombatant-design experience, the class has had significant issues.88 Danish
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designers took twenty-five years to achieve what the U.S. Navy has attempted
to accomplish with the LCS in a decade. In addition to the modularity and
adaptability requirements, the Navy added challenging high-speed and reducedcrewing requirements to the class, all with minimized weight margins.89 The
LCS challenges many, if not all, of the U.S. surface navy’s deeply entrenched
Elizabethan-school design principles, as well as operations and war-fighting
paradigms derived from that same philosophy.90 New surface combatants are
expected to field as front-line, best-of-class surface combatants whose relative
margin of superiority over potential adversary platforms slowly degrades over
time. But in practice, traditional ships do not obsolesce gradually; they do so
as soon as the next gun or missile is invented and deployed. In contrast, an Enterprise ship such as the LCS is deployed with a minimum viable capability and
then grows and matures its combat capability as new systems and new weapons
are developed; as noted earlier, Midway was commissioned operating F4U Corsairs and was decommissioned forty-seven years later operating F-18 Hornets.
The LCS is designed to accommodate a comparable corresponding range of
future capabilities.
Until the LCS, the U.S. Navy had not fielded a surface combatant without 100
percent of its war-fighting capability fully implemented on the lead ship of the
class since USS Spruance (DD 963) was commissioned in 1975. Unlike Spruance, which used space, weight, and power (SWAP) growth and capability margins to support future growth, LCS modules are designed to be added, removed,
changed, or upgraded easily within existing margins and interfaces to provide the
ship’s combat power. Like Hornet and Midway, LCS-class ships are expected to
evolve their capability over time, rapidly responding to emerging threats, emerging missions, and new technologies. For example, when the U.S. Army canceled
its Non–Line of Sight missile program, which the Navy intended to use as the
LCS’s primary antisurface missile, the Navy was able to replace it with another
missile system quickly.91 For nearly any other surface ship, the loss of its primary
missile system would have doomed the entire ship class immediately or necessitated a major refit and modernization effort. As noted before, lethality is determined by the missile being launched, not the ship launching it.
Like Langley, Lexington, Saratoga, and Ranger—Hornet’s innovative progenitors—the LCS got a lot right, but not everything. In building and operating these
ships, the U.S. Navy has learned much and was poised to move forward with better, bigger, and more-advanced Enterprise-design surface-combatant ships, incorporating constructive and progressive lessons learned from the original LCS class.
However, at present the U.S. Navy does not appear to be applying that experience.
The U.S. Navy’s future frigate (FFG[X]) and follow-on to the LCS, the Constellation (FFG 62) class, is a regressive multimission ship design. It was developed
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with iterative Elizabethan-school design methods that focus on immediate lethality and survivability using only current technology and building in only minimal
capacity for incorporating future technologies. Its largely off-the-shelf installed
systems will deliver defined war-fighting capability from day one for each hull,
but at the cost of eliminating all modularity and most features that would permit
future adaptability. The design also halves the Navy’s already-restrictive warship
displacement-growth margins to 5 percent (about 370 tons for each ship in the
class, as derived from the published displacement).92 A nominal additional SWAP
margin was added for an electronic-warfare system.93 This design permits no
adaptability and no modularity, and only some of the installed weapon systems
have any capability to accommodate unplanned growth. This is despite a broad
consensus that future surface-combatant weapon systems will include lasers, rail
guns, and a multitude of uncrewed vehicles, which will create additional electrical load and require new launch-and-recovery facilities and storage and repair
capabilities (see the table).
It is unlikely that any such future capability-growth requirements will fit into
a 370-ton margin or the additional defined SWAP margin, assuming that any of
it is still available after the first ship is built, tested, and fielded. As the head of
British ship construction noted in 1936, technology-driven war-fighting requirements are likely to change in rapid and unexpected ways, even while the first ship
is being built.
One exception to the Constellation class’s rigid design is its use of the Navy’s
new SPY-6 air-defense system. This is a fully modular and adaptable system that
proceeds from the best outcomes from forty years of experience with phasedarray radar technology and the integrated Aegis air-defense system. Over those
four decades, the U.S. Navy fielded five major versions of Aegis hardware (SPY1A; the B, D, and D[V] variants; and SPY-6), along with a dozen incremental
intermediate hardware upgrades—about one major modernization every eight
years. Conceivably then, over the forty years of the FFG-62 class’s expected service
life (ten years to build the class, plus the thirty-year service life of the last ship of
the class), the Navy should expect to field another five major hardware versions

EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON SHIP REQUIREMENTS

Unmanned systems

Power

Cooling

Personnel

Space

Bandwidth

Little change

No change

Increase

Unclear

Increase

Electromagnetic weapons

Increase

Increase

Little change

Increase

No change

Long-range targeting

Increase

Increase

Little change

Increase

No change

Increasing networking

Increase

Increase

More technical

Unclear

Increase

Source: John F. Schank et al., Designing Adaptable Ships: Modularity and Flexibility in Future Ship Designs (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016).

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,

23

130

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [], No. 1, Art. 8

or upgrades to the Aegis system. SPY-6’s innovative new design likely will accommodate most if not all future incremental hardware changes, but not the fielding
of a potential SPY-10 or SPY-12.
The history of the Constellation-class design illuminates the problem that the
Elizabethan school’s design rigidity poses for accommodating unknown future
war-fighting environments and requirements. The contracted FFG-62-class design
is derived from a French-Italian design dating from 2007 that is currently in service
in France, Italy, Egypt, and Morocco. In my assessment, it is a perfectly adequate
design for those navies. The derivative USN FFG(X) war-fighting requirements
themselves were developed between 2016 and 2017 to support a planned delivery
of the first ship in 2028.94 Thus, by the time the twenty-ship class is completed in
the 2030s, it will be a thirty-two-year-old design filling a twenty-two-year-old warfighting requirement, with little capacity to accept 2040s capabilities or be modernized to address contemporary war-fighting requirements.
Modern experience shows the sort of modernization challenges a twenty-twoyear-old war-fighting requirement embedded in an inflexible ship design can
raise. Twenty-two years ago, in 1999, the U.S. surface navy’s most pressing material issue was replacing the never-upgraded SPY-1B-equipped Ticonderoga-class
cruisers and modernizing the first twenty-one ships of the SPY-1D-equipped
Arleigh Burke–class destroyers built before 1999—without bankrupting the Navy.95 Going back another twenty-two years to 1977, the previously discussed and
costly New Threat upgrade and the original SPY-1A-equipped Aegis cruisers were
under construction or in design, and all were decommissioned or decommissioning by 1999. Twenty-two years before those upgrades and designs, in 1955, virtually all the surface combatants then in service would be decommissioned before
1977, save for a few gun cruisers that underwent a costly missile modernization.
Given this history and the current pace of change in maritime technology, it appears unlikely that the ships of the Constellation class will have much relevant
war-fighting capability over much of their planned service life.
That abbreviated combat utility compares poorly with the enduring capability in the Nimitz-class and Gerald R. Ford–class aircraft carriers and the Navy’s
amphibious ships. Today, forty-year-old ships carry the latest aircraft (F-18E/F
Block III, F-35B/C, and E-2D) as soon as the aircraft are available to their embarked air wings and Marine aviation elements, with no need to change the ship’s
war-fighting requirements. In 2021, an F-35C squadron embarked in USS Carl
Vinson (CVN 70), a thirty-nine-year-old ship, for the model’s maiden operational shipboard deployment.96 F-35B aircraft deployed for the first time in 2018
aboard USS Essex (LHD 2), which, like Carl Vinson, is one of the oldest ships of
its class.97 These deployments proceeded successfully despite, and Carl Vinson
and Essex were unaffected operationally by, delays in fielding the F-35; since the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/8
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ship designs are decoupled from aircraft-development schedules, they continue
to fly existing aircraft as long as needed without operational impact until the new
designs are ready to deploy.
As a thought experiment, consider what the U.S. Navy’s position could have
been today had the twenty-one Arleigh Burke–class destroyers and twenty-seven
Ticonderoga-class cruisers that required modernization at the turn of the millennium been built originally as modular, Enterprise-designed ships. Those fortyeight ships could be receiving SPY-6 radars today—replacing their original SPY1A, B, and D systems—the accompanying combat systems baseline upgrades, and
modern weapon suites during planned three-month, predeployment, pierside
modernization periods. Adding in the two Flight III DDG-51-class ships presently under construction with SPY-6 suites, the U.S. Navy could have had fifty of
the most modern, capable, and sophisticated surface-combatant ships in operational service before 2025, instead of just the two Flight III SPY-6 ships currently
under construction. Under current plans, and including the twenty planned, lesscapable Constellation-class ships, the Navy will field only forty-two SPY-6equipped surface-combatant ships, spread over the next quarter century.98
The Navy can do nothing about the design of those fifty destroyers and cruisers today, but the surface-combatant design decisions Navy leaders are making
today will bequeath those same modernization and shipbuilding problems to
their successors in coming decades. Without modularity and Enterprise-design
attributes, new surface combatants will need to be built to accommodate some
future SPY radar or Standard Missile, let alone some entirely new system such
as a swarm of drone weapons, a torpedo-firing underwater uncrewed vehicle, a
6G network, or a zettabyte shipboard quantum data center. Elizabethan-school
designs do not survive well in a fast-paced, changing technology environment,
whereas Enterprise designs thrive. Enterprise design, as implemented already
in the Navy’s aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and LCSs, and at the weaponsystem level within the Aegis program and a few other installed systems, dramatically accelerates war-fighting innovation and technology upgrades over classic
Elizabethan-school methods.99
The LCS and Aegis demonstrate that the U.S. surface-navy community is capable of true innovation, in the modern way. However, that community has stepped
away from learning from or capitalizing on this valuable, hard-won, hard-earned
experience—innovation, interrupted.
THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED
The engineers who designed Hornet and its sister ships, while contending with
the unexpected implications of these new cross-domain vessels, were making it up
as they went along—and they did well. Today, the U.S. Navy has a strong body of
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,
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shipbuilding and -design experience, lessons, and rigorous research and analysis
that transcends the innocence of those first aircraft carrier design engineers, creating a capability to make designs that can accommodate unknown future advances.100 As a prominent economics writer cautions, “It would be reassuring to think
of new technology as something we can plan. And sometimes, it’s true, . . . [b]ut
these examples are memorable in part because they are unusual. . . . [T]he idea that
we can actually predict which technologies will flourish flies in the face of all the
evidence. The truth is far messier and more difficult to manage.”101
To escape the costs of either modernizing or replacing rigid warship designs,
the Navy must abandon its Elizabethan-school engineering comfort zone for future surface-combatant designs and instead embrace the engineering sea change
begun in 1934 by modularizing both ships and shipboard weapon systems. Formally separating the details of specific war-fighting capabilities (lethality) from
the ship design and focusing instead on defining a robust but minimal set of shipto-weapon engineering interfaces, with appropriate (i.e., generous) margins, is a
proven method for enabling future flexibility and adaptability; the Navy has been
doing just this for nearly eighty years with its aircraft carrier designs. Warships
cannot be “future proofed,” but they can be designed with the inherent resilience
and capability for growth necessary to enable future generations to respond effectively to the still-emerging challenges of the twenty-first century using the ships
the Navy is building today.102
Hornet’s designers were unconcerned about B-25 takeoff weight or ordnance
load, because B-25s did not exist when Hornet was being designed in 1934; the
first B-25 flew in August 1940, just four months before Hornet was commissioned. But the Army bombers were able to take off from its decks on a radical, “game changing” combat mission just twenty months after the first B-25
flight. That did not happen because the Navy planned for it; it happened because
Hornet’s design did not preclude it from happening.103 Hornet was designed and
built with a “capability to have a capability”—innovation, unbound.
FIGHTING TODAY FOR THE FUTURE
The U.S. Navy has a long history of coming up with the right “stuff ” at the right
time, so that, when wars started, it had the right ships, airplanes, and systems to
accomplish its early war-fighting tasks. Despite the interwar financial strain during the 1920s and 1930s, when naval disarmament treaties and then the Great
Depression decimated both the service’s budgets and the composition of its fleet,
the Navy designed largely the “right” fleet for fighting the war in the Pacific.104
Wahoo and Hornet were both designed and built during those lean and tumultuous decades. All the hard design and conceptual work was done before the first
shots of America’s part in World War II were fired, so that all American industry
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/8
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needed to do was push its war-production capacity “full speed ahead” without
having to wait to design new ships.105
Today the Navy is at a critical juncture; it faces many choices ahead to ensure it
can deploy a strong, diverse, innovative toolbox of technologies against emerging
and future threats. But like Yamato’s designers and builders, who looked solely to
the past to predict the future, the U.S. surface navy also is burdened with unhelpful design history. Yet with Hornet and its sisters, the Navy looked forward, not
backward, to design and build ships that proved themselves victorious in a deadly
new combat environment against a formidable foe. The naval-aviation community has perpetuated that success now for decades in the face of dozens of new
technologies and completely unexpected maritime operational environments.
Against growing, or at least uncertain, future threats, the Navy’s surface community cannot deploy the latest capabilities in sufficient quantity using traditional, Elizabethan-school approaches to design. To attain the advantages of flexible,
adaptable operational capabilities that the naval-aviation community has enjoyed
and nurtured for nearly a century, it likely has to make hard choices to sacrifice
some near-term performance and war-fighting requirements to ensure its ships
retain long-term relevance. But as legendary race car driver Mario Andretti is
often quoted as saying, “If everything seems under control, you’re just not going
fast enough.”106 Now is the time for the Navy to “go faster”—to step away from
highly controlled and comfortable Elizabethan-school ship-design practices and
embrace a more fluid, adaptable, flexible, and much, much faster Enterprise shipdesign philosophy.

NOTES

1. Douglas Smith, Carrier Battles: Command
Decision in Harm’s Way (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2006), pp. xxvii–xxviii.
Emphasis added.
2. John Jordan, Warships after London: The
End of the Treaty Era in the Five Major Fleets,
1930–1936 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2020), p. 203.
3. Ibid., p. 204. Emphasis added.
4. Joel Holwitt, “Execute against Japan”: The U.S.
Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine
Warfare (College Station: Texas A&M Univ.
Press, 2009), pp. 1–2, 31–34, 42–47.
5. Expanded from author’s presentation, prepared with assistance from the USN Program
Executive Office Ships staff, in David Lewis,

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,

“Remarks Delivered at ASNE Combat Systems
Symposium” (Arlington, VA, 26 March 2012).
6. As discussed at length in David Evans and
Mark Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and
Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy,
1887–1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1997), pp. 370–83, and Malcolm Muir
Jr., “Rearming in a Vacuum: United States
Navy Intelligence and the Japanese Capital
Ship Threat, 1936–1945,” Journal of Military
History 54, no. 4 (October 1990), pp. 473–85.
7. Raymond A. Bawal,Titans of the Rising Sun:
The Rise and Fall of Yamato Class Battleships
(Clinton Township, MI: Inland Expressions,
2010), pp. 68–71; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun,
p. 373; Muir, “Rearming in a Vacuum,” pp.
473–85.

27

134

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [], No. 1, Art. 8

Japanese and American Carrier Task Forces
during World War II (New York: Harper &
Row, 1975), p. 133.

8. Author’s analysis developed from United
States Strategic Bombing Survey, Japanese
Merchant Shipping (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1947); John
Atkinson, Imperial Japanese Navy WWII
(Bromley, U.K.: Galago Books, 2002); Robert
Gardiner, Roger Chesneau, and Przemysław
Budzbon, Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 1922–1946 (New York: Mayflower
Books, 1980); Hansgeorg Jentschura, Dieter
Jung, and Peter Mickel, Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1869–1945 (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1977); and Evans
and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 383.

17. Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor:
The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United
States (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2007), pp. 186, 240; Azar Gat, A History of
Military Thought: From the Enlightenment
to the Cold War (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2001), pp. 698, 691.

9. The capital ships permitted to be retained
by the signatories are described in terms of
tonnage in Treaty for the Limitation of Naval
Armament, ch. II, pt. 1, 6 February 1922, T.S.
No. 671.

19. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 295.

10. The so-called London Treaty improved Japan’s relative permitted ratios for cruisers and
most types of minor vessels and auxiliaries
and revised submarine and armament restrictions. The treaty expired in 1936 and Japan
withdrew from negotiations for, and declined
to sign, a follow-on treaty in 1936. Treaty for
the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, 22 April 1930, T.S. No. 830.
11. Bawal, Titans, pp. 48–49, 58; Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 379; Mark Stille, The Imperial
Japanese Navy in the Pacific War (Oxford,
U.K.: Osprey, 2013), pp. 12–14, 16–17; Emily
Goldman, “The Spread of Western Military
Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan,”
in The Sources of Military Change: Culture,
Politics, Technology, ed. Theo Farrell and
Terry Terriff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
2002), pp. 57–59.
12. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 373; Stephen
Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, vol. 1,
The Period of Anglo-American Antagonism,
1919–1929 (Barnsley, U.K.: Seaforth, 1968),
p. 309.
13. Stille, Imperial Japanese Navy, p. 141.
14. Bawal, Titans, p. 184.
15. Ibid., pp. 97–98, 124–27.
16. The Japanese navy had six carriers (Shōkaku,
Zuikaku, Junyō, and three light carriers),
plus Hiyō fitting out, while the U.S. Navy had
just three (Saratoga, Hornet, and Enterprise).
James Belote and William Belote, Titans of
the Seas: The Development and Operations of

18. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, chaps. 2–6. Mahan
adapted Jomini’s theory of war to the maritime domain, as discussed in Gat, History of
Military Thought, chap. 4, and as refuted on
pp. 671–73, 676–80.
20. Asada, Mahan to Pearl Harbor, pp. 240–41;
Jordan, Warships after London, pp. 75–79,
287–90.
21. Trent Hone, Learning War: The Evolution of
Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898–1945
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018),
pp. 128–33; Frank Hoffman, Mars Adapting:
Military Change during War (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2021), p. 60; Holwitt,
“Execute against Japan,” pp. 63–67.
22. Jordan, Warships after London, pp. 221–27.
23. Jennifer K. Elsea and Richard F. Grimmett,
eds., Declarations of War and Authorizations
for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications (Hauppauge,
NY: Nova Science, 2009), p. 5.
24. Robert Kaufman, Arms Control during the
Pre-nuclear Era: The United States and Naval
Limitation between the Two World Wars
(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1990), pp.
65, 137–78. See also Roskill, Naval Policy,
vol. 1, pp. 327–28, and the U.S. ratification
of extending prohibitions on unrestricted
submarine warfare in the 1936 London Treaty
in Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy between
the Wars, vol. 2, The Period of Reluctant
Rearmament, 1930–1939 (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2016), p. 320. However,
Hoffman points out that the U.S. war plan
RAINBOW 5, approved on 19 November 1941,
called for “[destruction of] Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying [trade]
vessels.” Hoffman, Mars Adapting, pp. 59, 286;
see also Holwitt, “Execute against Japan,” pp.
45–47.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/8

28

Lewis: Innovation, Interrupted—Next-Generation Surface-Combatant Design

25. Holwitt, “Execute against Japan,” p. 1.
26. Clay Blair Jr., Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1975), pp. 415, 551–54;
Hoffman, Mars Adapting, pp. 69–76.
27. Lieutenant Commander Morton was a
brilliant, aggressive captain, and under his
command Wahoo became the most successful submarine in the Pacific Fleet, until its
loss in 1943. Lieutenant Commander O’Kane
transferred before Wahoo’s disappearance and
went on to be the most successful submarine
captain of the war, in command of USS Tang.
See Stephen Rosen, Winning the Next War:
Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991), pp. 130–47.
28. German U-boats sank 2,882 Allied ships totaling 14.4 million tons, peaking in 1942; U.S.
submarines sank 1,314 ships totaling 5.3 million tons, and 95 percent of Japanese prewar
merchant mariners were casualties, despite a
slow start. However, Allied shipping capacity
was so great that even these higher losses did
not impede either military or civilian wartime
supply needs decisively, while Japan’s military
and civilian shipping capacity effectively was
annihilated. Blair, Silent Victory, pp. 878–79.
29. There is some dispute on this point; see
Gary Weir, Forged in War: The NavalIndustrial Complex and American Submarine
Construction, 1940–1961 (Honolulu, HI:
Univ. Press of the Pacific, 2000), p. 115.
30. John Jordan, Warships after Washington:
The Development of the Five Major Fleets,
1922–1930 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2011), p. 153.
31. This discussion is derived from Norman
Friedman, “Have We Been There Before?
Launch/Recovery Lessons Learned from Carrier & Amphibious Ship Development” (remarks at “Launch and Recovery of Manned
and Unmanned Vehicles from Surface
Platforms: Current and Future Trends” conference, Annapolis, MD, 8 November 2005).
See also Roskill, Naval Policy, vol. 1, pp. 324,
416–17, on the U.S. Navy’s decision to convert
its big battle cruisers, the Royal Navy’s failure
to do the same, and the resulting respective
operational impacts.
32. Jordan, Warships after London, pp. 83–86,
91–97.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,

LEWIS

135

33. Author’s analysis; P-12 introduced in 1927;
T4M in 1928; F2F in 1934; BG-1 in 1934;
BT-1 in 1935; SBU-1 in 1935; SB2U in 1937;
F4F in 1940; SBD in 1940; and TBF in 1942.
This does not count functionally obsolete aircraft that were introduced briefly. See Gordon
Swanborough and Peter Bowers, United States
Navy Aircraft since 1911 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968), pp. 62–65, 310–13,
197–201, 193–94, 357–58, 397–98, 399–400,
205–10, 167–69, 213–16.
34. Per Jordan, “Ark Royal was arguably the best
carrier laid down for the Royal Navy in the
interwar period. . . . However, she was also a
prime example of the extent to which ‘ship’
rather than aviation characteristics continued
to dominate British carrier design during the
1930s. Although similar in size to the . . .
Yorktown class, she operated fewer aircraft,
had an aviation fuel capacity of 100,000 tons
compared with 187,000 tons, and had hangars
with low ceilings and narrow lifts that could
not accommodate spread aircraft.” Jordan,
Warships after London, p. 91.
35. Ibid., pp. 84–86; Norman Friedman, U.S.
Aircraft Carriers: An Illustrated Design History
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983),
pp. 65–70.
36. Friedman, U.S. Aircraft Carriers, pp. 77, 114;
Jordan, Warships after London, p. 96.
37. Craig Symonds, World War II at Sea: A Global
History (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press,
2018), pp. 270–74.
38. Bawal, Titans, p. 88.
39. Jonathan Page, “Flexibility in Early Stage
Design of US Navy Ships: An Analysis of Options” (master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, June 2011). From the abstract:
“In this application, the model predicts that,
on average, a flexible platform should not
only cost less to build, but also reduce modernization costs by 9% per ship over its life
cycle. Therefore, counterintuitively, building
a less-capable ship with the flexibility to expand capabilities or switch missions actually
provides greater expected utility during its
service life.”
40. James Holloway III, Aircraft Carriers at War:
A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam,
and the Soviet Confrontation (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), pp. xi–xiii.
See Peter Sims, Little Bets: How Breakthrough

29

136

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [], No. 1, Art. 8

Ideas Emerge from Small Discoveries (New
York: Free Press, 2011), pp. 13–14, 152, for
his discussion of an incremental approach to
innovation (i.e., “little bets”).
41. Susan Ronald, Heretic Queen: Queen Elizabeth I and the Wars of Religion (New York: St.
Martin’s, 2012), pp. 25–35.
42. The “Willie Sutton rule” is named for an
early-twentieth-century American bank robber’s apocryphal remark to a reporter that he
robbed banks “because that’s where the money is,” just as Spanish galleons were “where
the money was” in sixteenth-century Europe.
Susan Ronald, The Pirate Queen: Queen
Elizabeth I, Her Pirate Adventurers, and the
Dawn of Empire (New York: HarperCollins,
2007), pp. 26–37, 55–66; P. H. Colomb, Naval
Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated, Classics of Sea Power Series
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990),
pp. 26–27.
43. N. A. M. Rodger, The Safeguard of the Sea:
A Naval History of Britain, 660–1649 (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1999), p. 207.
44. Galleys could not mount heavy cannon
anywhere but at their bows or sterns, because
they were too narrow either to absorb their
recoil safely or to support the guns’ weight
abeam and, galleys being oared vessels, this
midships space was occupied already by
rowers. Julian Corbett, Drake and the Tudor
Navy: With a History of the Rise of England as
a Maritime Power (London: Longman, 1912),
pp. 1, 8–10; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp.
212–13; John Guilmartin Jr., Galleons and
Galleys (London: Cassell, 2002), pp. 158–60.
45. Geoffrey Moorhouse, Great Harry’s Navy:
How Henry VIII Gave England Sea Power
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), pp.
127, 130, 253–58; Corbett, Drake, pp. 29–30;
M. Oppenheim, A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant
Marine Shipping in Relation to the Navy, from
MDIX to MDCLX (London: J. Lane, 1896;
facsimile, 1961), pp. 52–60, 98–99.
46. Also called English “race-built” galleons. See
Guilmartin, Galleons, pp. 160–62; Corbett,
Drake, p. 352; Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, pp.
204–20; and Oppenheim, A History, p. 126.
47. Oppenheim, A History, pp. 129–32.
48. This professionalization of the navy made it
both less corrupt and more a national asset

than a personal possession of the queen. See
Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 230; Corbett,
Drake, pp. 342–50; and Oppenheim, A History, pp. 144–52.
49. Rodger, Safeguard of the Sea, p. 270. For
example, “one of [the] Armada captains
relates that the English fired their heavy guns
as quickly as the Spaniards did their muskets.”
Oppenheim, A History, p. 158.
50. The Royal Navy, in its modern form, would
not be born for another century. Rodger,
Safeguard of the Sea, pp. xxi–xxii.
51. Paul Johnson, The Birth of the Modern: World
Society, 1815–1830 (New York: HarperPerennial, 1991), p. 195. “Robert Fulton[’s] . . . first
patented boat, which had its trials on the
East River on 9 August 1807, was described
as ‘an ungainly craft looking precisely like a
backwoods sawmill mounted on a scow and
set on fire.’ ”
52. James Baxter, The Introduction of the Ironclad
Warship (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2001), chaps. 5, 10; Nicholas Lambert,
Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia:
Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1999), p. 75,
chap. 4.
53. Paraphrased from Baxter, Ironclad Warship, p.
3. For background on the stability of technology before Trafalgar, see Roger Knight, The
Pursuit of Victory: The Life and Achievement
of Horatio Nelson (New York: Basic Books,
2005); for an overview of naval operations
and engineering, see Harold Sprout and
Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval
Power, 1776–1918 (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1990); for a general naval
discussion of the period with a focus on economic issues, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and
Fall of British Naval Mastery (Dublin: Ashfield, 1976); for a detailed discussion of the
emergence of early steel battleships, see John
Beeler, Birth of the Battleship: British Capital
Ship Design, 1870–1881 (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2001), and Theodore
Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy:
French Naval Policy, 1871–1904 (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987).
54. The sad case of USS Wampanoag is applicable. It was designed in 1863 as a high-speed,
steam-powered anti-Confederate commerce
raider—but the U.S. Navy declared the
commerce-raiding mission obsolete after the
Civil War. Controversy over its sustainment

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/8

30

Lewis: Innovation, Interrupted—Next-Generation Surface-Combatant Design

cost, advanced propulsion system, and suspect
seaworthiness resulted in the ship’s decommissioning in 1868—after eight months of service.
Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval
Power, pp. 198–99; Don Leggett and Richard
Dunn, eds., Re-inventing the Ship: Science,
Technology and the Maritime World, 1800–1918
(Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2012), pp. 186–87.
55. Jordan, Warships after London, p. 166.
56. Both Jordan’s Warships after London and his
Warships after Washington contain numerous
examples, particularly Japan’s cruiser modernization in the 1930s. See Jordan, Warships
after Washington, pp. 155–59, 166.
57. Adding new technology into ships with
treaty-limited displacements required weight
reductions in other areas, challenging ship
designers and operational planners. Jordan,
Warships after London, p. 165.
58. Ibid., pp. 204–205. Also, “When the time
came for naval rearmament [after World
War I] it was size rather than versatility
that was the main objective of the building
programme.” D. M. Schurman, The Education of a Navy: The Development of British
Naval Strategic Thought, 1867–1914 (London:
Cassell, 1965; repr. Malabar, FL: Robert E.
Krieger, 1984), p. 188. This citation refers to
the Krieger edition.
59. Smith, Carrier Battles, pp. 81, 127, 130; Lars
Celander, How Carriers Fought: Carrier Operations in WWII (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate, 2018), p. 134. Similarly, USS Enterprise
(CV 6) renewed its entire air wing in August
1941, first replacing biplane fighters with
monoplane fighters and subsequently with
folding-wing fighters in March 1942. See
Barrett Tillman, Enterprise: America’s Fightingest Ship and the Men Who Helped Win
World War II (New York: Simon & Schuster,
2012), pp. 26, 56. Likewise, the next USS
Enterprise (CVN 65) changed its air-wing
configuration three times for its first two
deployments. See Holloway, Carriers at War,
pp. 184, 235.
60. Smith, Carrier Battles, pp. 128–32, 135–36.
All four Japanese aircraft carriers sunk at
Midway received their principal damage from
American carrier-based dive-bombers.
61. In their case, deck loading, overhead height,
ramp slope, ammunition storage, and troop
berthing, among a few others.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,

LEWIS

137

62. Jeff Kline [Capt., USN (Ret.)] (Professor of
Practice, Naval Postgraduate School), interview by author, 21 September 2021.
63. See Alexander Kossiakoff and William Sweet,
Systems Engineering: Principles and Practice
(New York: Wiley, 2002), pp. 5–14; Charles
Wasson, System Analysis, Design, and Development: Concepts, Principles, and Practices
(New York: Wiley, 2006), pp. 67–85; and
Sandra Dewitz, Systems Analysis and Design
and the Transition to Objects (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1996), pp. 14–20; as well as
many other fine engineering texts.
64. The “detect-to-engage” sequence is the
process by which a target is detected, identified, tracked, and then engaged by a weapon
system. Aegis was novel for combining these
processes into an integrated system, rather
than having standalone radar, combat, and
weapon systems.
65. Thom Shanker, “Missile Strikes a Spy Satellite
Falling from Its Orbit,” New York Times, 21
February 2008, nytimes.com/.
66. “Navy Abruptly Cancels New Class of Destroyer,” Columbus Dispatch, 31 August 2008,
dispatch.com/.
67. “The military services could all build a better
mousetrap; the problem came when they had
to go after different animals.” Craig Cameron, “The U.S. Military’s ‘Two-Front War,’
1963–1988,” in Farrell and Terriff, The Sources
of Military Change, p. 134. Sims calls this “the
illusion of rationality.” Sims, Little Bets, p. 25.
68. Richard Danzig, Driving in the Dark: Ten
Propositions about Prediction and National
Security (Washington, DC: Center for a New
American Security, September 2011).
69. Hence U.S. Defense Dept., Operation of
the Adaptive Acquisition Framework, DoDI
5000.02 (Washington, DC: Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 23 January 2020). On
the framework: “According to Undersecretary Lord, the Department of Defense’s
(DoD) new approach, called the Adaptive
Acquisition Framework (AAF), will be the
‘most transformational change to acquisition
policy in years, perhaps decades.’ Recognizing that the defense acquisition system
(DAS) for major systems ‘rarely enabled
speed’ and had design-to-delivery take
up to eight years, Lord looks to adopting
under AAF ‘best practices’ from industry

31

138

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [], No. 1, Art. 8

that would enable the AAF to bridge gaps
between design and fielding to ‘deliver
capability to our warfighters faster’ and, by
making the acquisitions process ‘move at the
speed of relevance,’ ensure responsiveness
to the National Defense Strategy’s (NDS)
prescription that the US prepare for great
power competition with Russia and China.”
Jack Deschauer, “Attention: Commercial
Startups—Major DoD Announcements
Regarding ‘Adaptive Acquisition Framework’
and Support for Emerging Technologies,”
National Law Review, 9 October, 2020,
natlawreview.com/.
70. Michael Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military
Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Univ. Press, 2010), chap. 7; David Barno and
Nora Bensahel, Adaptation under Fire: How
Militaries Change in Wartime (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2020), chap. 9. Also, per
Scharre, “more than thirty nations already
have defensive supervised autonomous
weapons” and “sixteen nations already have
armed drones.” Paul Scharre, Army of None:
Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2018), pp. 4, 369.
Brose explores some speculative operational
examples and impacts of autonomy in war
as well. Christian Brose, The Kill Chain:
Defending America in the Future of High-Tech
Warfare (New York: Hachette Books, 2020),
chap. 9.
71. Deschauer, “Major DoD Announcements.”
72. Page, “Flexibility.”
73. Robbin Laird, “Aboard USS Ford: More
Weapons, More Launches, Faster & Safer,”
Breaking Defense, 25 November 2020,
breakingdefense.com/.
74. Kai-Fu Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon
Valley, and the New World Order (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2018), p. 44; Eric
Ries, The Lean Startup: How Today’s Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to Create
Radically Successful Businesses (New York:
Crown Business, 2011), p. 294. Understand
minimum viable capability as an initial set of
capabilities that provide operational value
to the user but also permit and enable the
development of future improvements; derived
by the author from U.S. Defense Department concepts minimum viable product and
minimum viable capability release, as relates

to software acquisition, in U.S. Defense Dept.,
Operation of the Software Acquisition Pathway,
DoDI 5000.87 (Washington, DC: Office of the
Secretary of Defense, 2 October 2020), p. 22.
75. Charles Stanton, Medieval Maritime Warfare
(Barnsley, U.K.: Pen and Sword, 2015), chap.
7; Gillian Hutchinson, Medieval Ships and
Shipping (Leicester, U.K.: Leicester Univ.
Press, 1994), pp. 5–10.
76. Terry Terriff, “U.S. Ideas and Military Change
in NATO, 1989–1994,” in Farrell and Terriff,
The Sources of Military Change, pp. 98–101.
77. This makes the Danish navy a classic “early
adopter,” as discussed in Sims, Little Bets, pp.
131–33.
78. H. Hornhaver, “STANDARD FLEX Distributed Architecture Combat System,” Naval
Engineers Journal 107, no. 3 (May 1995), pp.
41–48; Hartmut Manseck, “The Royal Danish
Navy ‘Absalon’ Class Flexible Support Ship,”
Naval Forces 27, no. 3 (2006), pp. 99–107;
Hans Hesselberg [Capt., RDN], “RDN
Modularity” (remarks at ASNE Day 2013:
Engineering America’s Maritime Dominance,
Arlington, VA, 21 February 2013).
79. “Structure of the Navy,” Danish Defence,
updated 1 September 2020, forsvaret.dk/en;
Jeremy Stöhs, “Into the Abyss? European
Naval Power in the Post–Cold War Era,”
Naval War College Review 71, no. 3 (Summer
2018), pp. 20–21; Janne Matlary and Øyvind
Østerud, Denationalisation of Defence (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 130–31.
80. “While Denmark could be characterised as
a ‘defensive, non-provocative actor’ during
the cold war, it can be claimed that in the
post–cold war period Denmark has emerged
as a ‘civilian/military offensive actor,’ and since
9/11 could be considered as a ‘strategic offensive actor.’ ” Matlary and Østerud, Denationalisation, pp. 118–19.
81. Kurt Birger Jensen [Rear Adm., RDN] (Admiral Danish Fleet), interview 2006; Stöhs,
“Into the Abyss?,” p. 29; Kristian Haumann
[Cdr., RDN], “Experiences and Operational
Lessons Learned” (remarks at ASNE Flexible
Ships Forum, 17 November 2016), pp. 9–12.
82. Edward Lundquist, “Royal Danish Navy
Growing into New Missile Defense Role,”
Defense Media Network, 15 January 2020,
defensemedianetwork.com/.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/8

32

Lewis: Innovation, Interrupted—Next-Generation Surface-Combatant Design

83. Andrew Chuter, “Britain Goes with Danish Design for New Navy Frigates,” Defense
News, 12 September 2019, defensenews.com/;
“Steel Cut for First Type 31 Frigate—HMS
Venturer,” Navy Lookout, 23 September 2021,
navylookout.com/.
84. Megan Eckstein, “What the U.S. Navy Could
Learn from Danish Frigate Design,” USNI
News, 5 March 2015, news.usni.org/; Per
Hesselberg [Capt., RDN], interview by Vago
Muradian, Defense & Aerospace Report, 29
November 2016, defaeroreport.com/.
85. Ellen Lord (former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, U.S.
Defense Dept.), interview by author.
86. Hornhaver, “STANDARD FLEX.”
87. Defined by the Danish navy as ninety days.
Hesselberg, “RDN Modularity.”
88. See, for example, cost, manning, maintenance, and mission-module-delay issues
in Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Littoral Combat
Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues
for Congress, CRS Report (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 17 December 2019).
89. From the author’s experience, the “rule of
two” in shipbuilding is never to introduce
more than two new major technologies in
any new ship class, flight, or baseline. The
U.S. Navy violated this rule of thumb in the
Seawolf, LCS, Gerald R. Ford, and DDG-1000
classes with negative impacts, but did so in
the Spruance, Ticonderoga, and Arleigh Burke
shipbuilding programs with good outcomes.
90. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press,
1962), pp. 10–22.
91. “Army Cancels NLOS-LS Missile System; LCS
Implications Could Be Big,” Military.com, 23
April 2010; Carlo Munoz, “Navy to Arm LCS
with New Missile System,” Breaking Defense,
20 October 2011, breakingdefense.com/.
92. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Frigate (FFG[X])
Program: Background and Issues for Congress
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, 26 June 2020).
93. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Constellation (FFG62) Class Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 29 September 2021),
pp. 19–20.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,

LEWIS

139

94. Kevin Smith [Capt., USN], “New Construction & Modernization Issues, Challenges,
and Opportunities as the Navy Migrates to a
Digital Environment and Digital Engineering” (remarks at American Society of Naval
Engineers Virtual Technology, Systems &
Ships Symposium, 27 January 2021, virtual).
95. David Larter, “Do the Earliest Arleigh Burke–
Class Destroyers Still Have Legs? The US
Navy Thinks So,” Defense News, 13 January
2021, defensenews.com/.
96. Ryan Pickrell, “A US Navy Carrier Strike
Group Is Deploying with Advanced 5thGeneration F-35C Stealth Fighter Jets for the
First Time,” Business Insider, 22 August 2021,
businessinsider.com/.
97. Gidget Fuentes, “First Marine F-35B Combat
Deployment Hints at New Roles for Amphibious Ready Group,” USNI News, 27 February
2019, news.usni.org/.
98. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy DDG-51 and
DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background
and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, 24 February
2021). Existing Aegis SPY-1D systems already
have been “modularized” to support requirements for the Aegis Ashore Phased Adaptive
Approach (PAA). Department of Defense
Appropriations for 2012: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Defense of the H. Comm. on
Appropriations, 112th Cong., p. 164 (2012)
(statement of Ray Mabus, Secretary of the
Navy). However, Aegis-equipped ships have
not been modified to support the installation
or change-out of those module designs.
99. In the thirty-eight years that Aegis ships have
been in commission, there have been five
major versions of the SPY radar and ten major hardware or software baselines, for a total
of fifteen major upgrades. This averages out
to one major upgrade every two and a half
years, or roughly one upgrade per nominal
ship-deployment cycle. Had any of the eightynine Aegis ships built for the U.S. Navy been
of an Enterprise design, those ships could
have been outfitted with the most modern
radar and the most capable combat system
continuously throughout their service lives.
Each deployment by such surface combatants
would have fielded the Navy’s most modern
and capable war-fighting systems, just as the
Navy’s aircraft carriers have done for the past
eighty-seven years.

33

140

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [], No. 1, Art. 8

100. See, for example, prior work cited in Page,
“Flexibility,” and Jonathan Mun, “Flexible
Ship Options” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1 October 2018).
101. Tim Harford, Adapt: Why Success Always
Starts with Failure (New York: Farrar, Straus,
Giroux, 2011), p. 84.

technology performance as a predictor for a
new, future surface ship life-cycle operational
technology performance model.
103. However, having done it once more or less by
accident, the U.S. Navy proceeded with the
idea of developing purpose-built, carrierbased bombers and flew a prototype before
the end of the war. Thomas C. Hone, Norman
Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles, Innovation
in Carrier Aviation, Newport Paper 37 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2011).

102. Megaproject research identifies poor risk
assessments as using EGAP (everything goes
according to plan) principles rather than
MLD (most likely development) or even
worst-case-scenario methods to assess project 104. Edward Miller, War Plan ORANGE: The U.S.
risk. See Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius, and
Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 (AnWerner Rothengatter, Megaprojects and Risk:
napolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007),
chap. 29.
An Anatomy of Ambition (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), pp. 80–85, 138. 105. Arthur Herman, Freedom’s Forge: How AmerAlso see the closely related discussion of Flyvican Business Produced Victory in World War
bjerg’s “reference class forecasting” and the
II (New York: Random House, 2012), pp.
planning fallacy in Daniel Kahneman, Think85–106.
ing, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus,
Giroux, 2011), pp. 249–51. This article is itself 106. “We have to be comfortable being uncomfortable.” Sims, Little Bets, p. 45.
grounded in reference class forecasting, using
past aircraft carrier life-cycle operational

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol75/iss1/8

34

